Abstract-The disposal of public crisis prevention problem was researched, and we established the game model between local government and inspection department. From the point of profit maximization, the operation efficiency of local government and inspection department was analyzed. Through the results, got from the model, some advices were proposed to guide the improvement of public crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Crisis prevention and management of preparedness and response is "the idea that, raising, training and the use of troops" relationship, in the preparation phase, training, advocacy, research and training plan is a major task, however, based on the work of all of these specialized management agencies as the Government's failings missing. Government crisis management subjects, including central and local governments, specific and can be divided into the Central Government, the various functional departments, local government, local government functions. When limited to incidents in parts of the hazards, the main manager was higher governments and relevant departments in the region; when unexpected events spread throughout the country, spread to all areas, the management also extends to the main central government and central ministries. Government organizations are not only representatives of public interest, is also represents the interests of its members, when the personal interests of the public interest consistent with the officials, the officials consciously strive to achieve the public interest; when the public interest and government officials are inconsistent and even conflicting interests when, self-motivation may lead officials to deviate from the public interest. To achieve personal interest in this game is individual rationality, collective rationality to achieve the public interest, and potentially the individual rationality may lead to collective irrationality. In a sense, the crisis prevention and management of the process, government departments and between the upper and lower levels of Right and Interest in the distribution and the corresponding incentive mechanism is maximized. As driven by short-term interests, some government departments will not choose to crisis prevention and control input to short-term profits. Therefore, the Government sector in crisis prevention and management duties and responsibilities can also be included in the areas of game theory to study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
My academic research in this area started late, although not as some scholars say -"China Crisis and Crisis Management currently at the initial stage of crisis and crisis management research involves mostly quite broad theory, Almost without exception, they do not study China experienced crisis and crisis management " [1] , but there are obvious deficiencies, mainly in a large number of published qualitative research, quantitative research serious shortage of [2, 3] .
Game theory originated in the beginning of this century, in 1994 von Neumann and Morgenstern • co-author of "Game Theory and Economic Behavior," laid the theoretical foundation of game theory. Since the 50s of the 20th century, some scholars, such as Nash, Selten, Harsanyi, and others to make the final maturity of game theory into practical. The past 20 years, game theory as the analysis and resolution of conflict and cooperation tools, in the management of science, international politics, ecology and other fields is widely applied [4, 5] . This article will apply game theory to the local government's crisis prevention and supervision work will model the study efficiency. 
. Suppose the local a said the local government, which said the local government of its intention to crisis prevention work carried out to conceal the situation, so that in a crisis if there is slack in the prevention of the situation will be difficult to detect; 12 a that local governments interested in working condition for its crisis prevention and not to hide, if it exists in crisis prevention slack condition part of inspector would easily be found. If the inspection found that local governments work in their crisis prevention the situation there is a negative response and will require the additional cost p c of retention of crisis prevention, crisis prevention if both the local government for its work to conceal the negative response to the issue, part of the inspectors a false report, will have to give the corresponding administrative penalty P . Crisis prevention work to discover the problems local government inspectors departments will receive awards, assuming reward amount E .
IV. CHARACTERIZATION
First introduced by the conversion Hai Sani Virtual Human Nature select the type of local government [6, 7] Caused by the separation strategy separating equilibrium is such a balance: gamer select different in different types of action.
The second strategy is confused with strategy
Pooling strategy is gamer always choose the same action. In a pooling equilibrium in gamer balance in the observed action does not update his belief after the [8, 9] .
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V. CONCLUSION
The nature of the model can be drawn, on the one hand incentives for risk management inspector must have a certain strength, or will fall short of hard work to stimulate the effect of inspectors, inspection departments will be difficult to guarantee the local government's crisis management work careful monitoring of active and effective. On the other hand, the crisis management by local governments to conceal their work in their state without any cost cases, the working conditions through the way to hide and escape crisis prevention task, therefore people should consider setting up a report and networks, and many direct communication tool, allowing local governments to hide the high cost of their work, thus abandoning the negative attitude of responsibility.
